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Abstract  
Employees continue to be the weak link in organizational security management and efforts to improve 
the security of employee behaviors have not been as effective as hoped. Researchers contend that se-
curity-related decision making is primarily based on risk perception. There is also a belief that, if 
changed, this could improve security-related compliance. The extant research has primarily focused 
on applying theories that assume rational decision making e.g. protection motivation and deterrence 
theories. This work presumes we can influence employees towards compliance with information secu-
rity policies and by means of fear appeals and threatened sanctions. However, it is now becoming 
clear that security-related decision making is complex and nuanced, not a simple carrot- and stick-
related situation. Dispositional and situational factors interact and interplay to influence security de-
cisions. In this paper, we present a model that positions psychological disposition of individuals in 
terms of risk tolerance vs. risk aversion and proposes research to explore how this factor influences 
security behaviors. We propose a model that acknowledges the impact of employees’ individual dispo-
sitional risk propensity as well as their situational risk perceptions on security-related decisions. It is 
crucial to understand this decision-making phenomenon as a foundation for designing effective inter-
ventions to reduce such risk taking. We conclude by offering suggestions for further research. 
 
Keywords: Information Security; Risk Disposition; Risk Tolerance; Risk Aversion. 
1 Introduction 
Are some individuals predisposed to taking security risks? This interesting question has not been an-
swered adequately in the literature, particularly in the information security context. Research has long 
shown the influence of individual dispositional factors (including the so-called “Big Five Factors” and 
others) on a range of attitudes and behaviors. Such disposition differences might explain why two in-
dividuals with exposure to the same situations (organizational environment, training, threat vectors, 
etc.) often react to security threats in different ways, and why security policies do not guarantee com-
pliance. Insiders continue to be identified as a primary vector for information security incidents (Willi-
son and Warkentin 2013; ITRC, 2015), and why a majority of data breaches are caused by human vul-
nerabilities (Korolov, 2015). Such vulnerabilities enable hackers to bypass perimeter controls, such as 
firewalls, and enter into organizational networks or personal computers by social engineering methods, 
and also contribute to breaches facilitated with employees who are tricked into divulging information 
or permitting access to computers and networks. It is thus crucial to understand individual differences 
that impact employee security behavior.  
It is, however, disingenuous to associate individual security behavior solely with disposition; the same 
individual would make dissimilar decisions in different situations. For instance, when in the middle of 
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a project, an employee might tend to ignore requests for software updates on computers. However, 
after just having finished a project, a worker would be likely to comply with a request to update soft-
ware on their computer.  We will approach this research by considering both dispositional and situa-
tional factors that influence security-related behavior, specifically suggesting dispositional risk toler-
ance or aversion as a significant factor contributing to information security behaviors. Nguyen and 
Kim (2017) show that there is difference in security behavior related to risk propensity; however, 
clearly risk propensity is highly context dependent and their research does not account for situational 
factors in risk-related decision making that we intend to examine. Our goal is to examine security be-
havior of individuals through the lens of risk decision making theories while considering both disposi-
tion and situational context.  
Other researchers have studied risk-taking behavior in terms of individual differences and/or experi-
ences. For example, Deo and Sundar (2015) demonstrated a significant gender difference in risk taking 
behaviors. Cameron and Shah (2015) found that personal experience of a disaster led to people behav-
ing in a more risk averse way. Goudie et al. (2014) found that unhappy people were more likely to 
take risks than those who are happy. Even in rock climbing (Llewellyn and Sanchez, 2008), individual 
differences led to differences in risk-taking behavior. In several fields, there is evidence that personali-
ty differences are significantly implicated in risk-taking behaviors, and we will benefit greatly from 
the findings in other fields as we conduct the research outlined in this paper. Caspi et al. (1997) show 
a strong influence of personality in predicting health-risk behaviors. Mishra and Lalumière (2011) 
found that personality traits such as impulsivity, sensation-seeking, and low self-control were correlat-
ed with risk-taking behaviors. Jochemczyk et al. (2017) report that a Present-Hedonistic time perspec-
tive is linked to risk-taking propensity. Hoyle, Fejfar, and Miller (2000) found, in their study into sex-
ual risk taking, that conscientiousness played a mitigating role in mediating risk-taking behavior.  
The role of disposition and security behavior has been well studied but there is little research in the 
context of studying disposition and security behavior. The context of security is different than other 
fields where risks are relatively static compared to security where the threat landscape and risks are 
constantly evolving; resulting in a higher cognitive load in decision making. Also, we are evaluating 
users based on risk to the organization than the risk they perceive to their own wellbeing. 
In this research, we plan to provide different situational contexts to users and then to elicit their pro-
jected behavior in the context. Their behavior will then be associated with their personality traits to 
study the role of disposition on security behavior. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 
2 provides a brief review of the literature that focuses on the behavior theories used for explaining se-
curity behavior of individuals; section 3 presents our conceptual model for the paper along with the 
hypotheses and research design; section 4 discusses our methodology; section 4 discusses implications 
for research and practice and section 5 provides the conclusion to the paper. 
2 Literature Review 
Several models that capture users’ rational thinking have been used to study human security behavior, 
including the theory of planned behavior (TPB), protection motivation theory (PMT), and deterrence 
theory. The theory of planned behavior, first proposed by Azjen (1991), suggests that the intention of 
an individual to engage in a behavior is directly impacted by the individuals’ personal beliefs about the 
behavior and expectation of others towards compliance with the behavior and by the perceived control 
of the individual in exercising the behavior. This presumes a rational approach to decision making and 
action. 
Protection motivation theory (PMT) (Rogers, 1983) is based on classic risk analysis that postulates 
that the actions of a user are driven by a “cognitive mediating process” of assessing: (1) the perceived 
severity of threat, (2) the perceived vulnerability to the threat, (3) perceptions of utility of recommend-
ed behavior (recommended response to the threat), and (4) the user’s self-efficacy in executing the 
behavior. Herath and Rao (2009b) used PMT to study the security behavior of employees in organiza-
tion and found that (a) threat perceptions about the severity of breaches and response perceptions of 
response efficacy, self-efficacy, and response costs are likely to affect attitudes toward security policy; 
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(b) organizational commitment and social influence have a significant impact on compliance inten-
tions; and (c) resource availability is a significant factor in enhancing self-efficacy, which in turn, is a 
significant predictor of policy compliance intentions. These essential perceptions can be manipulated 
by communicating a fear appeal to the employee, designed to enhance threat appraisal and coping ap-
praisal factors mentioned above (Johnston and Warkentin 2010). However, the findings from numer-
ous PMT-based studies have been inconsistent, leading to efforts to enhance fear appeals by making 
them more personally relevant (Johnston, et al. 2015). 
Deterrence theory, the other primary foundation theory for information security behavior research, is 
also grounded on rational choice theory, and suggests that humans base decisions on an examination 
of the consequences of their actions in terms of gains (pleasure) and losses (pain). By increasing the 
“pain” through the imposition of formal sanctions (punishment), the decision calculus is altered such 
that the potential offender recognizes the consequences of policy violation in the workplace (such as 
employment termination) and is deterred from forming the behavioral intention to engage in such 
transgressions. Deterrence theory holds that the individual is dissuaded by greater levels of (1) per-
ceived sanction severity, (2) perceived sanction susceptibility (likelihood of being caught and pun-
ished), and (3) sanction celerity or swiftness. By manipulating the levels of these three factors, the 
theory suggests that employers can deter their employees from engaging in policy violation behaviors. 
In the past two decades, a number of seminal studies have applied deterrence theory to explain IS be-
haviors such as computer abuse (D’Arcy et al. 2009; Straub and Welke 1998; Harrington 1996), in-
formation security policy violations by employees (Siponen and Vance 2010; Willison and Warkentin 
2011), internet usage policy violations (Ugrin et al. 2008), and illegal copying of software (Siponen et 
al. 2012). However, as with the application of PMT to the focal phenomenon, the research results have 
been mixed (D’Arcy and Herath 2011). 
Each of these foundational theories is based on the assumption of rational choice in human decisions. 
There is an implicit assumption that we are motivated to avoid negative consequences, i.e. losses from 
threats or punishment via sanctions. Several studies, however, have shown that assumptions about ra-
tionality are unsound because they do not adequately explain people’s actual real-world decisions. De-
cision makers have repeatedly been shown to violate the tenets of expected utility in making risk deci-
sions based on framing effects (Gilovich, Friffin, and Kahneman, 2002; Hastie and Dawes 2001; 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; and Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Tversky and Kahneman (1981) 
show that risk decisions are situational. Research has shown that individuals are risk-averse when 
dealing with gains, but are risk-seeking when faced with information regarding losses. These studies 
have been conducted at a population level, but we will apply these principles to our study of individual 
behavior. Moreover, in the information security context, people are influenced by their social context 
and their reliance on their colleagues (Posey et al., 2014). 
There are likely to be individual differences that impact risk decision making. These differences need 
to be understood, especially in the context of information security. Warkentin et al. (2012a) and John-
ston, et al. (2016) discuss the influence of personality traits and meta-traits in predicting the intention 
to comply with security policies and have found that complex interactions between various Big Five 
personality factors, known as meta-traits, influence individuals’ perceptions of threats and sanctions, 
and offer insights into designing proper organizational measure such as security training that extends 
beyond the simple “one size fits all” approaches currently employed. Shropshire et al. (2015) evaluate 
the role of conscientiousness and agreeableness personality traits and found that they partially explain 
the discrepancy between behavioral intention and actual behavior in the security context. 
Fundamentally, situational human risk behavior is likely to be influenced by individual perceptions of 
risk that can be simplified to an assessment of the potential rewards for risky behavior vs. potential 
costs.  It’s a balancing act: perceived rewards vs. uncertain costs. Risk taking increases as perceived 
magnitude of loss decreases or expected reward increases. It is clear that situational factors play a 
large part in decision making under uncertainty and risk. For instance, individuals may engage in high-
risk behavior in their personal life yet be very conservative when making decisions at work. However, 
individual differences in risk tolerance and risk propensity may play a role too. That is, a person’s in-
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herent propensity toward risky behavior may influence the risk calculus underlying security behavior. 
Risk seekers are likely to have reduced perceptions of loss and reward than those who are risk-averse. 
Individual risk behavior is complicated and the result of several interacting influences, including situa-
tional cues regarding rewards and threat, prior disposition to risk, possibly framed by previous out-
comes in risk situations, and tendency towards sensation-seeking behaviors (Zuckerman et al., 1964, 
Zuckerman, 1974; Zuckerman and Kuhlman, 2000). Personality traits also play a role, with high risk 
behavior associated with high extraversion and openness, and low neuroticism, agreeableness, and 
conscientiousness (Nicholson et al., 2005).  
We argue that information security behavior is influenced in part by individual differences in risk pro-
pensity. That is, a person’s tendency to engage in unsecure acts is due in part to a willingness to take 
risks. Rohrmann (2004) defines risk propensity as a general positive attitude toward taking recognized 
risks. In an information security context, risk propensity may lead people to ignore or overlook securi-
ty warnings and policies. In this paper, we present a blueprint of research that will examine the psy-
chological disposition of individuals in terms of risk tolerance vs. risk aversion and the degree to 
which this balance will influence their security behaviors. Based on this fundamental premise, we in-
tend to propose a model to study: (1) Impact of dispositional risk on computer security behavior; and 
(2) Degree to which we may be able to consequently impact risky behavior. Subsequent to this we at-
tempt to answer the following research questions: 
 
1. Does dispositional risk tolerance influence situational/contextual risk tolerance in context of com-
puter security behavior? 
2. Does general propensity to risk taking influence the mental calculus of risk in a specific situation, 
with particular application to the information security decision-making context? 
3 Proposed Research Model 
Our conceptual model is displayed in Figure 1 and expands on a model of decision making presented 
by Sitkin and Weingart (1995), which incorporated both risk propensity and risk perception (Figure 1). 
Risk perception is the assessment of “the expected loss by an individual and the uncertainty associated 
with the event”. Risk propensity is defined as “an individual’s tendency to undertake risky behavior” 
(p. 12). They further note that risk propensity is an emergent trait that evolves from outcomes of pre-
vious decisions and risk perceptions are also shaped by prior outcomes. Finally, they contend that 
framing can influence risk perception and consider that as an antecedent to risk perception in their 
model. This is a more realistic view of risk decisions and we use this to more comprehensively model 
security-related decision making. 
 
 
Figure 1: Sitkin and Weingart (1995) Risk Decision Model 
Although risk propensity has been examined in several contexts (e.g., age (Duell et al., 2017), finan-
cial decision making (Stewart and Roth, 2001), gender (Morgenroth et al., 2017), driving behavior 
(Hatfield and Fernandes, 2008), health behavior (Harrison et al., 2005), measurement of the construct 
Warkentin, et al., Risk Disposition and Security Behavior 
 
Twenty-Fifth European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), Portsmouth, UK, 2018 5 
 
is problematic (Renaud and Warkentin, 2017). Hatfield and Fernandes (2008) identified several prob-
lems with existing measures of risk propensity, including inferring propensity from self-reports of 
risky behavior (circular logic), and the failure to distinguish risk propensity from risk perception (i.e., 
separating the willingness to engage in risky behavior from the perception that the behavior is risky). 
Other research has equated risk propensity with sensation seeking, but that represents a very narrow 
view of what is most likely a multi-dimensional construct. Rohrmann (2004) presented and validated a 
multi-dimension measure of risk propensity that we will apply to the information security context. 
This measure assesses the motives behind valuing risk positively in addition to risk aversion and expe-
rience-seeking tendencies.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Conceptual Risk Decision Model 
3.1 Hypotheses 
Our original intention was to determine whether there was a behavioral link between risk disposition 
and risk perception. If such a link exists, lessened perceptions could lead to riskier behaviors. Hence 
we intend to explore the link between individual risk propensity and risk perception (H2), and between 
such perception and risk-related decisions (H1). Risk propensity is also likely to colour an individual’s 
perception of the rewards and costs of a particular behaviour (H6), and this will potentially color their 
risk perceptions too (H4). Since situational factors will be likely to mediate this, we also plan to ex-
plore this causal link (H5). Finally, if they have engaged in a particular behavior before, we need to 
ascertain whether this impacts their risk perceptions too (H3).  
 
H1a: As perceptions of risk increase in security domain, it leads to less risky (security) behavior  
H1b: As perceptions of risk decrease in a security domain, it leads to more risky (security) behavior 
H2: Risk propensity influences risk perception in security domain, such that individuals with high 
propensity for risk (or “risk-seekers") are likely to perceive less risk in any particular setting 
H3a: Prior positive outcomes from previous risk decisions reduces the level of risk perception  
H3b: Prior negative outcomes from previous risk decisions increases the level of risk perception  
H4a: Prior positive outcomes from previous risk decisions reduces the level of risk propensity 
H4b: Prior negative outcomes from previous risk decisions increases the level of risk propensity 
H5a: Situational factors influence perceived rewards 
H5b: Situational factors influence perceived costs 
H6a: Risk propensity influences perceived rewards 
H6b: Risk propensity influences perceived costs 
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3.2 Research Design 
To assess our research hypotheses empirically, we propose an experimental design in which we meas-
ure individual dispositional variables with established scales, we manipulate situational variables (such 
as levels of threat and sanctions, as Johnston, et al. (2016) did), and we hold other variables constant, 
which will enable us to measure associations with (or impacts on) the dependent variable: behavioral 
intent either to comply with, or violate, information security policies. (We will also seek to measure 
actual behavior where possible, within the constraints of our data collection regime). The proximal 
measure for this behavior will likely be the research subject’s stated security decisions within a scenar-
io context. Furthermore, we anticipate mediation from risk perceptions – namely the perceptions of 
situational risk (which we will measure in the context of research scenarios) and the measure of dispo-
sitional risk by the individual decision makers, following extant rigorous measures found in the litera-
ture. 
We plan to use an experimental design because our model and hypotheses are grounded in theory and 
published research. We are interested in testing causal relationships specified in our model and hence 
an experimental design is deemed most appropriate because it will allow us to manipulate independent 
variables, control extraneous and nuisance variables, and observe effects on outcome variables. The 
constructs of interest are relevant to different populations and situations and thus can be tested using 
various samples.  We plan a combination of lab and field experiments, where we present or place par-
ticipants in scenarios that require decisions to comply with security policies or heed security warnings. 
We will measure risk propensity as an individual variable, manipulate situational factors, measure risk 
perceptions, and observe decisions. We anticipate measuring prior outcomes by asking subjects about 
their experiences with threats and responses, using measures established by Mutchler and Warkentin 
(2015). We will also apply previously published and validated scales for dispositional factors such as 
personality traits and meta-traits (Johnston, et al., 2016) and dispositional risk aversion (Filbeck et al., 
2005). The situational variables (independent variables) will be factors that might influence the cost-
reward calculus that underlies security decisions, such as time urgency, workload, environmental safe-
guards, incentives, and social norms and pressure. All measurement scales will be developed accord-
ing to established guidelines (Churchill, 1979; Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001) for scale de-
velopment, including literature reviews, expert panel reviews for construct validity and face validity, 
and pilot studies to establish scale and item validity with confirmatory factor analysis. 
Initial studies might be low-fidelity simulations where participants are presented with a number of dif-
ferent scenarios (that manipulate situational variables) and are asked to indicate how they would re-
spond to the scenario. Following guidelines for mixed-method research provided by Venkatesh, 
Brown, and Bala (2014), we will commence with qualitative data collection using in-depth interviews 
to establish design validity (including descriptive validity, credibility, and transferability) and inferen-
tial validity (including interpretive validity and confirmability), which will then guide our subsequent 
research methods.  These studies can be conducted with participants face-to-face in a laboratory set-
ting (e.g., using university employees and students) and online with specially selected panels of partic-
ipants using assessment service providers such as Qualtrics. We will follow these studies with experi-
ments in which participants perform realistic job-related tasks that involve security decisions. We have 
relationships with several organizations that will allow us to recruit their employees for these experi-
ments. We have also designed and used in-basket and job simulation tasks that can be adapted for use 
in these experiments.  
The scenarios used in the various studies will be designed to assess the impact of disposition and situa-
tional factors (and their interaction) on a range of information security decision outcomes, such as 
password hygiene decisions, data backup decisions, physical security decisions, encryption decisions, 
online activity decisions, and others, which will enable us to generalize to information security policy 
compliance overall, as well as general computer security hygiene. Scenario development will conform 
with guidelines established by Siponen and Vance (2014). 
Our model predicts that situational factors and risk propensity have indirect effects on risk perception, 
through perceived rewards and costs of security compliance. Risk propensity and prior outcomes are 
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also seen as having direct effects on risk perception. The complete model will be tested in phases. 
First, we will test mediated effects of situational and disposition variables on risk perception through 
perceived rewards and costs. We will use the bootstrapping approach to statistical mediation analysis 
with a categorical independent variable (i.e., situational factor) outlined by Hayes and Preacher 
(2014). This will allow us to assess the indirect, direct, and total effects of risk propensity and situa-
tional variables on risk perception. Next, we will test the relationship between risk perceptions and 
risk decisions and examine if risk perceptions mediate the effects of prior outcomes, risk propensity, 
and risk calculus.   
4 Implications for Research and Practice 
In devising interventions to reduce risk taking in the information security context, we need to ground 
our work in an appreciation of the variability of risk-taking behaviors leading to non-compliance. As a 
discipline, we do not yet have that insight. Empirical findings are required in order to advance the field 
in this respect. Further research is required so that we can formulate appropriate interventions that re-
duce risky information security behaviors. Jeffery (1989) argues that any intervention to reduce risk-
taking behavior should meet three requirements: (1) benefits to the individual are substantial and vir-
tually guaranteed, (2) the interval to realisation of the benefit is short, and (3) response cost of the be-
havior is low. Information security behavior, on the contrary: (1) is often costly in terms of effort, (2) 
benefits to the individual (as opposed to the organisation) are marginal, and (3) benefits are seldom 
realised at all by the person carrying out the behavior. This makes mitigation of risk taking in the secu-
rity context particularly challenging. This is particularly the case if we persist in using the tried yet 
untested interventions currently deployed by organizational managers, namely one-size-fits-all infor-
mation security training, augmented by persuasive messages (such as fear appeals) and official sanc-
tions (punishments). We need a deeper understanding of why people decide to behave riskily, on an 
individual and societal level. Once we have this understanding we can design interventions in a more 
nuanced and effective way. In the long run, this basic scientific understanding of the nature of human 
decision making in this context will also convey to organizational practice as the scientific results are 
translated into operational programs implemented within the organizational context. 
5 Conclusions and Future Work 
Grounded in the perspective that individuals often follow irrational decision processes, we suggest a 
variance model to explain information security decisions that incorporates human dispositional factors 
as well as situational factors as antecedents. Deeper understanding of user decision making in the con-
text of information security behavior will enhance our ability to tailor specific interventions for differ-
ent employees to improve their effectiveness. The research is based on the human risk decision-
making model proposed by Sitkin and Weingart (1995). It incorporates psychological risk propensity 
of individuals and their perceptions of risk based on situational factors. We seek to establish the theo-
retical foundations for an empirical research study to be conducted over the next year. We believe the 
research findings from our study will facilitate a richer, more granular application of organizational 
influence measures, ranging from personalized security training to customized persuasive messages, 
which will prove to be more effective means to encourage improved employee security decisions. 
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